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Note on Abbreviations to Historical Texts
The works of Kant that are cited in this project are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of
Immanuel Kant, eds. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood.
Kant’s works are referred to using the numbering in the Akademie Edition, and the following
abbreviations:
A/B

Critique of Pure Reason

Corr.

Correspondence

CJ

Critique of the Power of Judgement

CPR

Critique of Practical Reason

Discovery

On a Discovery whereby any new critique of pure reason is to be made
superfluous by an older one

Groundwork

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

JL

Jäsche Logic

Mrongovius

Metaphysik Mrongovius

NM

Negative Magnitudes

Proleg.

A Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come
forward as science

Texts by other authors are cited with the original date of publication, with the date of the edition
used listed in the bibliography.
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Introduction
Ludwig Wittgenstein famously wrote that “in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we
should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable … we should have to be able to think what
cannot be thought” (1921, 3). Writing roughly one hundred and twenty years after Immanuel
Kant’s death, Wittgenstein was keenly aware of the theoretical complications involved in the
drawing of limits. Perhaps, as he wrote this, Wittgenstein was also keenly aware of the troubled
legacy of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had embarked
on an attempt to draw the very limits of speculative reason—on the knowable—but he found that
in order to secure the bounds of the knowable, it was necessary for him to speak of unknowable
‘things in themselves.’ Kant seemed to straddle both sides of the limit: he appears to have been
claiming to know what is supposed to be, by his own terms, unknowable. Because of this
precarious position, the philosophical theory that stands at the heart of Kant’s philosophy,
transcendental idealism, has been problematized since its very inception.
Among the problems surrounding the thing in itself, the attack on transcendental
idealism’s doctrine of ‘noumenal affection’ stands out as a decisive objection to Kant’s
philosophy. According to transcendental idealism, the subject’s mind is causally affected by
things in themselves, producing sensations in the mind which are then synthesized resulting in
our experiences of the empirical world (what Kant calls ‘appearances’). Noumenal affection is a
crucial part in the explanation of the possibility of our experience, and therefore this doctrine is
an indispensable part of transcendental idealism. But this doctrine, as many have rightly
observed, seems to be fundamentally incompatible with Kant’s own claim that things in
themselves are unknowable by us. This fundamental incompatibility is known as the ‘legendary
problem of noumenal affection.’
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As one might expect, this legendary problem has also attracted the attention and efforts of
those who are sympathetic to Kant. In the past few decades many have leapt to Kant’s defense on
exactly this problem.1 But what is interesting is that, while all seem to agree on what the problem
is, an agreement on the general direction a solution should take has not likewise emerged. Even
more troubling is the fact that each sympathizer seems to have wildly differing conceptions on
what the exact details of the theory are, and thus which are the essential parts of the theory that
need preserving. The result is a medley of potential solutions to a seemingly monolithic problem,
but the solutions, if successful, seem to be hardly generalizable to all concerned parties as they
are informed by contentious presuppositions about the theory that is being defended. Thus,
solutions that turn on weakening certain commitments of transcendental idealism will surely be
unacceptable for those who think such commitments are a crucial part of the theory itself and so
should remain untouched.
It is in this context that my project arises. This project is about the legendary problem of
noumenal affection, but it is not primarily an attempt to deliver a knockdown solution or
argument against the problem, one more among the many that have been produced in the
literature. Instead, the approach I take in this project is broadly diagnostic; rather than making a
new move on the existing board, my goal is to reexamine the game itself. I will be reevaluating
the problem by beginning with figuring out who the problem is a problem for. In other words,
under what understanding of the theory does the problem metastasize? I then examine the
supposedly incompatible components of the theory to reveal the presuppositions that have
shaped the problem and consequently have dictated the resources available within Kant’s own
theoretical framework to resolve it. I argue that the common way scholars have understood the

1

For example, see: Rescher (1972), Allison (1983; 2004), Langton (1998), Piché (2004), and Hogan (2009a;
2009b).
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components of the problem suffers from serious textual and philosophical worries and propose
my own account of how they should be understood. In the final analysis of the problem, with the
doctrines reconfigured and updated, I show a potential solution out of the problem that Kant has
available to him that was unavailable under the previous understanding of the problem.
The Chapters
The three chapters in this project reflects the three components of the legendary problem of
noumenal affection: (1) Kant’s view, transcendental idealism, (2) the doctrine of noumenal
affection, and, (3) its seemingly incompatible counterpart, the doctrine of noumenal ignorance.
In chapter one, I introduce the relevant interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism.
The reading I propose is known in the literature as the metaphysical interpretation, and I
recapitulate the way it understands the fundamental commitments of the theory. With a stable
account of the theory in tow we can better appreciate what is at stake but also why the problem
has been so incredibly difficult to resolve, and why many believe that the theory inevitably folds
under the pressure of the problem. We will see that if we are committed to preserving the
integrity of the theory’s commitments, a solution will not come easily. In the second part of the
chapter, I consider three common criticisms that have been lodged against the metaphysical
reading that question its credentials from an interpretive standpoint. I argue that these objections
to the metaphysical interpretation are defeasible concerns and conclude that the problem of
noumenal affection is still the real credible threat that the theory needs to face.
In chapter two, I argue that the common causal interpretation of noumenal affection
suffers from textual and philosophical problems and I present my own alternative account, which
I call the grounding interpretation. Under the causal construction, noumenal affection
presupposes knowledge of the affecting relation (i.e., causality), but this presupposition conflicts
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with the text in which Kant seems to claim that we lack knowledge of the affecting relation.
Furthermore, the causal interpretation necessarily finds Kant guilty of applying the categories
transphenomenally. Thus, the solutions that adopt this construction of the problem are severely
limited and are forced into making moves that seem to undermine or weaken the theory. In
contrast, the grounding interpretation that I offer avoids these problems. I argue for this account
based on a holistic approach to the text, where I consider as much of the textual evidence for
noumenal affection as possible, choosing not to focus only on the causal passages. Under my
account, noumenal affection is a generic claim of ontological dependence based on the logical
concept of ground and consequence, rather than the transcendental concept of cause and effect.
My account will have the twofold benefit of avoiding the textual and philosophical problems of
the causal interpretation and of explaining several interpretive questions surrounding the way
Kant talks about noumenal affection that have been largely ignored in the literature.
Chapter three completes the diagnostic of the problem by investigating the doctrine of
noumenal ignorance to see whether it is ultimately compatible with noumenal affection. Recent
developments in Kant scholarship on Kant’s account of cognition and its difference from
knowledge paves the way for a more rigorous and textually accurate understanding of noumenal
ignorance as the denial of our cognition of things in themselves. I argue that on the corrected
understanding of noumenal ignorance there can be knowledge of things in themselves without
cognition of them, and thus revealing, from within Kant’s own framework, a potential way out of
the stubborn and thorny problem of noumenal affection. I end the project by considering the
implications of the proposed account of noumenal ignorance on a longstanding debate in Kant
scholarship over the question of whether transcendental idealism is committed to the existence of
one or two worlds.
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1
Transcendental Idealism
Introduction
The legendary problem of noumenal affection is a devastating critique to the philosophical
theory at the heart of Kant’s critical philosophy, transcendental idealism. Kant says that
transcendental idealism (henceforth, TI) is the “key” to solving all the problems that have
troubled metaphysics, such as skepticism of the external world, causation, and God (A xiii), and
in his ethics, Kant appeals to transcendental idealism for the possibility of free will (Groundwork
4:448). TI is important for Kant and for understanding his philosophy. To comprehend the
challenge the problem of noumenal affection (henceforth, NA) poses, we will first need to have a
basic grasp of transcendental idealism, the position that it critiques.
In the literature on TI, there are two opposing interpretations known as the metaphysical
and epistemological readings which interpret the commitments of TI in radically different ways.2
Unfortunately, there is no consensus on which interpretation gets the view right. In this chapter, I
will present the metaphysical interpretation of TI because it strikes me as the more plausible
account that is more consistent with Kant’s larger philosophical concerns, and because the
problem of noumenal affection was originally conceived under the metaphysical reading of TI.
In the first section of the chapter, I present a metaphysical interpretation of three
fundamental commitments of TI. These are: (i) the transcendental distinction between
appearances and things in themselves, (ii) the claim that we cannot know things in themselves
(noumenal ignorance), and (iii) the claim that we are affected by things in themselves (noumenal

2

See Ameriks (1982) for a helpful overview.
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affection). In the second section, I consider three common objections that have been posed to the
metaphysical interpretation of the theory. They each argue that, under the metaphysical reading,
TI is inconsistent and take this inconsistency as evidence for the inadequacy of the metaphysical
interpretation. I argue that none of these objections succeed, and I conclude that the problem of
noumenal affection is the most credible threat to transcendental idealism.
I

The Metaphysical Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism
One of the most well-known components of transcendental idealism is its distinction

between appearances (spatiotemporal objects) and things in themselves. Kant thinks that human
experience results from two cognitive faculties that he calls ‘sensibility’ and ‘understanding’
(A51/B75). The former provides us with the objects to think (through what Kant calls
‘intuitions’), and the latter thinks those objects by applying concepts to them. The sensibility, as
a source of our cognition3, possesses two a priori forms of intuition: space and time. These forms
are conditions for our experience of objects, they dictate that all objects must be presented to us
spatiotemporally. Kant argues in the Aesthetic that space and time are merely subjective
conditions of our minds, and not the objective condition of things in general (A39/B56). This
means that space and time are unique to creatures like us alone and are not some kind of
Newtonian ‘universal substance’ or Leibnizian relation that would, in principle, attach to any
possible object. This entails that the whole spatiotemporal world is—in some way—constituted
by our minds; thus, Kant’s radical claim that “we ourselves bring into the appearances that order
and regularity in them that we call nature” (A125).
However, Kant does not conclude that the empirical world is just an illusion and that
nothing else exists besides it. Rather, he takes the mind-dependency of appearances to indicate

3

Kant later defines ‘experience’ as ‘empirical cognition’ (B147).

7

that there is some aspect of reality that is inaccessible to creatures like us. Kant refers to this
mysterious part of reality as ‘things in themselves’ and says that “nothing whatsoever [can be
known] about the things in themselves that may ground [the appearances]” (A49/B66).
Our ignorance of things in themselves is the direct consequence of their inaccessibility to
our minds that can only receive objects insofar as the objects are presentable spatiotemporally.
However, Kant thinks that the sensibility is a ‘receptive’ faculty that only produces sensible
intuitions when the mind is affected in some way, in contrast to the understanding which is a
‘spontaneous’ faculty that “brings forth representations itself” (A51/B75).4 This means that the
faculty of sensibility provides intuitions (objects to think) only if “[the object] affects the mind in
a certain way” (A19/B33). But what is this initial object that affects the mind? Contrary to
empiricist models of sensibility, this object cannot be the ordinary spatiotemporal objects in our
experience (appearances), because, according to Kant’s theory, they are supposed to be the
products of the mind. If appearances are the output of the mind’s operation, then it would be
absurd if they were also the inputs, for then appearances would need to “bootstrap” their way
into existence (Falkenstein 1995, 348). If the affecting objects are not appearances, then they
must be the things in themselves.5 Therefore, according to TI, things in themselves are
indispensable criteria for human experience.6
We now have a basic grasp of transcendental idealism as being fundamentally committed
to the following three claims: (i) the distinction between appearances and things in themselves is
a distinction between two different levels or aspects of reality, (ii) we can have only knowledge

4

Kant considers the receptivity of our intuitive faculty to be a hallmark of our cognition, whereas the putative divine
cognition of God would operate with an ‘intellectual intuition’ that would bring its objects into being just by
representing them, thus not requiring sensibility (B145).
5
An exception to this dilemma is Erich Adickes’ idea of there being a double affection (1924). This is an unpopular
view and in large part it is due to one of its conjuncts being noumenal affection (Stang 2015, 3).
6
See Discovery (8:215).
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of appearances and not things in themselves (following the literature, we can call this claim
noumenal ignorance—‘NI’ for short), and (iii) the claim that affection through supersensible
things in themselves is necessary for human experience (NA).
It is important to stress the fact that the metaphysical interpretation commits TI to an
ontological distinction between appearances and things in themselves. This ontological
understanding is the engine that drives the basic understanding of both NA and NI. This feature
is what most distinguishes the metaphysical interpretation from the competing epistemological
accounts by scholars such as Graham Bird (1962), Gerold Prauss (1974), and Henry Allison
(1983; 2004). On their accounts, the distinction between appearances and things in themselves
consists in an epistemological distinction between ‘two different ways of considering an object.’
Their shared account understands Kant to be mainly concerned with the conditions of thought
(hence epistemological) and as rejecting altogether the procedure of metaphysics as being
concerned with ontology (Allison 2004, 120), and so their accounts will read NA and NI
differently. While the epistemological account of TI has earned favor in scholarship, it is beyond
the scope of my project to consider it here, and thus I set it aside in favor of the metaphysical
interpretation.7
The main import of the metaphysical reading, then, is that transcendental idealism is
understood as being essentially committed to the claim that appearances and things in themselves
constitute two ontologically distinct levels or aspects of reality and that we genuinely lack
knowledge of the latter.
The metaphysical interpretation is the most historically common and accepted
understanding of transcendental idealism. However, among those that agree with the

7
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metaphysical reading on an interpretive level many believe that the resultant account of
transcendental idealism is philosophically unviable.8 In other words, they accept that this
interpretation gets Kant right, but they hold that Kant’s view cannot be accepted. This sentiment
is supported by objections that transcendental idealism is internally inconsistent. These
objections stack the deck against the view, and if they are successful, they would make the
problem of noumenal affection superfluous. Therefore, to substantiate the problem of noumenal
affection my goal is to argue that none of these objections succeed.
II

Three Objections to the Metaphysical Interpretation

This section will consider three separate objections against the metaphysical interpretation of
transcendental idealism. Interestingly, each objection is unique and turns on different
considerations. The first objection, which is the most historically common one, argues that
transcendental idealism is a form of phenomenalism. The second objection is that transcendental
idealism is inconsistent with its own commitment to empirical realism. The third objection
presents a set of textual evidence from the Critique that is often taken to contradict the
ontological interpretation of the transcendental distinction. My strategy for these three objections
is to prove that they are defeasible concerns, and whenever possible I will refer to some
promising solutions that have been offered in the literature by those sympathetic to the
metaphysical interpretation.
First Objection: Phenomenalism
This objection centers on understanding transcendental idealism as a form of ‘phenomenalism.’9
Phenomenalism is the view that objects in space and time are merely mental representations or
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For e.g., Strawson (1966) and Guyer (1987).
Phenomenalism has come to denote a large variety of views and has gained much attention in recent scholarship.
Here I consider phenomenalism largely in the way that the objection was originally described by Kant’s
9
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mental entities and has been closely associated with Berkeley’s idealism (Sassen 2000, 53). The
motivation for reading Kant in this way is due in part to his seeming characterization of
appearances as ‘mere representations.’ For example, in the Aesthetic, he writes that “what we
call outer objects are nothing other than mere representations of our sensibility” (A30/B45).
Thus, some Kant scholars, such as Strawson, take this to mean that “[the physical world] only
appears to exist, [but] is really nothing apart from perceptions” (1966, 238). This objection
seems to turn on the assumption that phenomenalism is not a tenable view, and it argues that
because transcendental idealism is a form of phenomenalism, we should reject it. While it can be
argued whether phenomenalism really is untenable and ought to be dismissed, we can simply
grant it for the sake of comprehending this objection’s argument.10
The grief surrounding phenomenalism is due to its understanding of appearances as
merely mental entities, which are nothing apart from our perceptions. Phenomenalism presumes
that, for Kant physical objects, like tables or chairs, don’t actually exist, i.e., they are nothing
over and above our representations of them. To the proponents of phenomenalism, this is
supposed to represent a highly unappealing theory of what external objects are, metaphysically
speaking. Indeed, we should grant that it is a highly unappealing theory because Kant himself
was adamantly opposed to this sort of radical idealism, and he was incensed that his own
transcendental idealism was compared with Berkeley’s immaterialism which he calls “dogmatic
idealism” (B274).
Two points suffice to show that phenomenalism is a defeasible objection for the
metaphysical reading. First, it relies heavily on the interpretation that an appearance being a mere

contemporaries in the Feder-Garve review, and which seems to have remained in the works of Strawson (1966, 2367) and Guyer (1987, 334-5).
10
It was under this assumption that key figures in German philosophy during and after Kant’s time (e.g.,
Mendelssohn, Fichte, and Schelling) thought that Kant’s philosophy needed to be ‘overcome’ (Stang 2016b, 11)
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representation means that it is nothing other than the representation in our mind. But this ignores
how Kant holds objects to exist even when they are unperceived by us (A493/B521).
Furthermore, Kant often talks about the scope of empirical reality in terms of our ‘possible
experience,’ and this seems incompatible with the phenomenalists’ claim that objects are only
real in our perceptions. Thus, Kant says that we must admit there may be inhabitants of the moon
“even though no human being has ever perceived them … [because] in the possible progress of
experience we could encounter them” (Ibid). This demonstrates that phenomenalism is an
uncharitable reading of the text.11 Moreover, that Kant revises the Critique in response to
phenomenalist interpretations and dedicates certain places in the Prolegomena to address the it
explicitly shows that he disavowed this inaccurate understanding of his view and sought to
prevent readers from misinterpreting his ideas in this vein.12
The second point that calls into question the phenomenalist interpretation is that there are
more compelling alternative metaphysical accounts, and which are often highly critical of
phenomenalism.13 Where phenomenalism understands appearances to be merely mental entities
which are nothing apart from our perceptions, other metaphysical readings cash out appearances
in a different way. For example, Rae Langton argues that the distinction between appearances
and things in themselves actually refers to two different kinds of properties, extrinsic (relational)
properties, and intrinsic (non-relational) properties (1998, 13). Alternatively, Lucy Allais (2015)
argues that this distinction is analogous to the difference between secondary and primary
qualities. In either account, an appearance is not understood as an ontologically separate entity
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Christian Garve, one of the reviewers of the Feder-Garve review, admitted this in a personal letter to Kant. He
cites his ‘incapacity’ and that he made the wrong decision to review a work that “was too difficult” for him (Corr.
10:329).
12
See the “Refutation of Idealism” added in the B edition (B274-9), and Kant’s remarks in note III of the
Prolegomena (4:290-4).
13
E.g., Langton (1998), Allais (2015).
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that exists only in my perception, but rather as an ontologically distinct level or aspect of reality.
This demonstrates that we can reject the phenomenalist interpretation of TI without necessarily
rejecting or abandoning the metaphysical interpretation. However, we needn’t here commit
ourselves to any particular metaphysical account; rather it is enough for our purposes to show
that the metaphysical interpretation in general is well equipped to deal with the problems
associated with phenomenalism.
Second Objection: Empirical Realism
The objection from empirical realism turns on the claim that a metaphysical interpretation of
transcendental idealism is incompatible with a robust commitment to empirical realism. Since
empirical realism is one of transcendental idealism’s commitments (A371), this objection argues
that the metaphysical reading must be incorrect because it is incompatible with one of the
fundamental commitments of the very position it is trying to understand.
Specifically, this objection assumes that an understanding of the transcendental
distinction between appearances and things in themselves as metaphysically distinct entities is
fundamentally incompatible with a robust account of empirical realism. We can see how this
objection works by recalling the phenomenalists’ reading which takes appearances to be merely
mental entities. For, surely, a view which holds that empirical objects are merely perceptions in
our minds cannot be consistent with empirical realism. Allison puts the objection this way: “once
statements about things considered as they are in themselves are taken as claims about how they
really are, it becomes difficult to avoid taking statements about appearances as claims about how
they merely seem to us to be. And this, in turn, is hard to reconcile with any robust form of
empirical realism” (2004, 46). To Allison, the ontological interpretation of the transcendental
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distinction reduces appearances to ‘how things merely seem to us to be,’ and this is
fundamentally incompatible with empirical realism.
However, this objection seems to work primarily against the phenomenalist
interpretation, which we already saw reasons for rejecting. In fact, Allison directs this criticism
towards phenomenalism and he makes the stronger claim that Kant has no way of preserving
empirical realism “save somehow deontologizing the transcendental distinction” (2004, 46-7).
But deontologizing the transcendental distinction means abandoning the metaphysical
interpretation, which for the purposes of this project, we do not want to do. Instead, we can look
to more recent developments of metaphysical accounts that reject the phenomenalist
interpretation altogether.
Lucy Allais’s account provides a good example. She understands appearances to be what
she calls the “essentially manifest features” of objects (2015, 125). To Allais, appearances refer
to an aspect of an object, i.e., their extrinsic or relational properties. And these properties are, in
turn, grounded on the intrinsic and non-relational properties of the object which we cannot
cognize (144). In Allais’s account, appearances and things in themselves are ontologically
distinct in the sense that they are metaphysically separate features or aspects of a single object, in
contrast to the phenomenalist account which takes them to be ontologically distinct entities. By
offering an alternative metaphysical account that doesn’t rely on (and expressly rejects) the
phenomenalist reading, Allais thus undermines the objection that the metaphysical interpretation
of TI is incompatible with a robust account of empirical realism.
Third Objection: Deflationary Evidence
Another common objection against the metaphysical reading is that there is a set of textual
evidence which seem to suggest that Kant does not consider the transcendental distinction to

14

refer to two ontologically distinct levels or aspects of reality, thereby challenging the way
metaphysical interpretations want us to understand the distinction.14 If it turns out that Kant does
not think appearances are somehow ontologically distinct from things in themselves, then the
metaphysical reading must be incorrect. On the contrary, I argue that this objection is defeasible
by showing how metaphysical interpretations can accommodate these passages.
We saw in the previous section that Kant thinks human experience begins by affection
through supersensible things in themselves (noumenal affection). This is evidence that Kant
considers things in themselves to be ontologically separate from appearances, for otherwise it
would make no sense to say they are the causes appearances. However, scholars point to a
conflicting set of textual evidence that seem to suggest things in themselves and appearances are
actually ontologically identical. These are passages in the Critique where Kant talks about the
transcendental distinction as a distinction between two different ways of considering an object.
For example, consider the two following passages, (a) and (b):
(a) [T]he same objects can be considered from two different sides, on the one side as
objects of the senses and the understanding for experience, and on the other side
as objects that are merely thought at most for isolated reason striving beyond the
bounds of experience. (B xviii-xix)15
(b) But they [other philosophers] did not consider that both [inner and outer sense],
without their reality of representations being disputed, nevertheless belong only to
appearances, which always has two sides, one where the object is considered in
itself (without regard to the way in which it is to be intuited), the other where the
form of the intuition of this object is considered. (A38/B55)
In (a) Kant talks about how objects can be considered from two different sides, one side is when
we consider them within the limitations of experience (the conditions imposed upon us by our
faculties), and the other side is when we consider them beyond the limitation of experience. In
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This set of textual evidence is commonly taken as motivation for the epistemological interpretation I briefly
mentioned above.
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All emphases in block quotes are in the original, except when they are underlined.
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(b) he essentially makes the same point, where the two different ‘considerations’ of the object
essentially involves regarding or disregarding the conditions of experience. And as indicated in
(b), the ‘two sides’ are referring to appearances and things in themselves respectively.
These two different ways of considering that lead us to appearances and things in
themselves seems to suggest that there is nothing metaphysical or ontological going on. If an
appearance is just the consideration of an object in accordance with the conditions of
experience16 (i.e., space, time, and the categories), then it is not necessary to think of
appearances as capturing some more ontologically fundamental aspect or level of reality. Instead,
if the distinction just captures two ways of considering an object, then there is only the one single
object that is being considered in two separate ways. Thus, these passages are meant to
undermine the metaphysical interpretation by challenging its ontological interpretation of the
transcendental distinction.
However, it is possible to read these passages in a way that is compatible with the
metaphysical reading. I argue that Kant’s concerns surrounding dialectical illusion explains his
usage of this more epistemological type distinction and is not meant to conflict with the other
passages that suggests the ontological distinction. But because dialectical illusion only comes to
the forefront much later in the Critique, we will need to take a brief detour through the
“Transcendental Dialectic” where Kant talks about dialectical illusion.
In the Dialectic, Kant shifts his focus to our third and final cognitive faculty, reason. 17
Kant says that reason is the judging faculty and Kant he defines ‘dialectic’ as the ‘logic of
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Supposing that there are conditions for experience, these conditions might not be ontological conditions. On
Allison’s reading, he proposes to understand them as epistemic conditions, which he distinguishes from ontological
and psychological conditions (2004, 11).
17
“All our cognition starts from the senses, goes from there to the understanding, and ends with reason, beyond
which there is nothing higher to be found in us.” (A298/B355)
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illusion’ (A293/B249). ‘Dialectical illusions’ are errors of judgement which Kant thinks arises
from the very nature of reason itself (A339/B397). He demonstrates in the Paralogisms and in the
Antinomies that dialectical illusion consists of an erroneous judgement about things in
themselves and/or appearances. For instance, in the “Fourth Paralogism” Kant argues that the
Cartesian skeptic’s argument—that we can only be certain of our inner thoughts—rests on a
dialectical illusion. The skeptic argues that we cannot be certain about the external world
because we only indirectly perceive it through its effects on our faculties. Kant’s move against
the skeptic is to undermine her idea that inner thoughts are anymore immediately perceived than
our perceptions of the external world because both are just appearances. As appearance, the
perception of inner thoughts (what Kant calls inner sense) is no more privileged representations
than outer sense, because qua appearance they are both “mere modifications of our sensibility”
(A491/B519). As Kant puts it, the mind “intuits itself not as it would immediately self-actively
represent itself, but in accordance with the way in which it is affected from within, consequently
as it appears to itself, but not as it is” (B68-9). This serves as a case of dialectical illusion
because it involves the failure to correctly judge whether our representations are appearances or
things in themselves.
The passages involving the transcendental distinction as two different ways of
considering an object is Kant’s warning of dialectical illusion. He is not saying that appearances
and things in themselves are merely two different ways of considering an object; rather he is
saying that an object can always be considered by reason either as an appearance, or as a thing in
itself. This is crucial because reason is responsible for dialectical illusion, and dialectical illusion
is essentially an error of judgement, whereas “in the senses there is no judgement at all”
(A294/B350). In the Aesthetic, Kant tells us that appearances are the products of sensibility, i.e.,
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empirical intuitions (A20/B34), so in this context it is not how I merely consider an object that
makes it an appearance; it is an appearance in virtue of being the output of sensibility. The role
of reason and its power to judge introduces a new element which makes it possible to confuse
appearances and things in themselves. This explains what Kant means when he says that the
transcendental realist “makes these modifications of our sensibility [appearances] into things
subsisting in themselves, and hence makes mere representations into things in themselves”
(A491/B519). This analysis makes it possible that Kant employs two different and compatible
usages of the transcendental distinction. One, based on the role of sensibility, is ontological, and
the other, based on the role of reason, is merely epistemological.
Let me show how this analysis could apply to the problematic passages. Take another
look at the second passage:
(b) But they [other philosophers] did not consider that both [inner and outer
sense], without their reality of representations being disputed, nevertheless
belong only to appearances, which always has two sides, one where the object
is considered in itself (without regard to the way in which it is to be intuited),
the other where the form of the intuition of this object is considered.
(A38/B55)
Kant begins by saying that ‘other philosophers’ failed to realize appearances always have ‘two
sides,’ depending on how they are considered. By invoking the ‘other philosophers’ and their
failure to realize the two-sidedness of appearances owing to the way we consider them, Kant is
hinting at dialectical illusion. But dialectical illusion, along with the two-sidedness of
appearances, only reflects the possibility for reason to judge incorrectly. It is correct that nothing
ontological is involved in the case of mistakenly considering the properties or the ontological
status of an object (for example, if I mistakenly consider dolphins to be a species of fish).
However, if these passages are tethered to the concerns of the Dialectic, then this distinction
between two ways of considering is both necessary for Kant’s purposes and compatible with an
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ontological distinction of appearances and things in themselves. Therefore, I conclude that the
metaphysical interpretation has a way of accommodating these passages by reading them in light
of the Transcendental Dialectic’s concern with dialectical illusions.18
III

A (Not so Defeasible) Fourth Objection: The Problem of Noumenal Affection

Having considered the three common objections and the possible responses the metaphysical
interpretation has available to it, we can now shift our attention to the legendary problem of
noumenal affection.
We have seen that the metaphysical interpretation takes TI to be committed to the
doctrine of noumenal affection, which states that human experience begins by the mind being
affected by supersensible things in themselves. In addition, it is also committed to the doctrine of
noumenal ignorance, which states that we cannot have any knowledge of things in themselves.
The problem of noumenal affection is the seeming incoherence that results from the conjunction
of these two claims. For by what right does TI assert that things in themselves affect us, if it also
categorically denies that we can have knowledge of them? This is the legendary problem of
noumenal affection; it is supposed to show that Kant’s transcendental idealism is fundamentally
incoherent.
Had it turned out that the previous objections were successful, there may not be anything
especially interesting about this problem. After all, it would simply amount to another way of
beating a dead horse. But there is a reason why the problem of noumenal affection has retained
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There is another set of passages which have also been taken as evidence for a deflationary reading of things in
themselves that I did not have the space to discuss here. These are passages that explicitly have to with
transcendental freedom, e.g., in the B Preface (B xxvii) where Kant talks about taking the object in a “twofold
meaning.” The general analysis here will apply to those passages as well. The context in which that distinction
occurs involves Kant’s explicit admission that transcendental freedom is a “problematic concept” and a “noumenon”
(A541/B569). Thus, we should carefully analyze those passages in relation to the considerations Kant makes about
transcendental freedom in the Antinomies.
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its significance since the very publication of the Critique and remains the subject of scholarly
attention.19 The problem is not just a formidable one, but also because, in contrast to the previous
objections, it captures an innate tension within transcendental idealism. In attempting to draw the
very boundaries of experience and human knowledge, Kant finds it necessary to refer to
something beyond these bounds, the things in themselves. As such, this is not a problem that
simply disappears by looking for alternative metaphysical accounts, as was the case in the first
two objections, or by attending to textual concerns alone, as it was in the third objection.
Regardless of where one stands within the interpretive metaphysical landscape, the problem of
noumenal affection will be waiting. This is the real substantive problem for metaphysical
interpretations. The rest of this project is dedicated to understanding it, and then, once
reexamined, to explore a potential solution.
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For more recent work on the problem, see: Piché (2004), and Hogan (2009a; 2009b). Allison (2004) provides an
extensive treatment of the problem in the third chapter of his book. Kitcher (2011) also offers an account in the
twelfth chapter of her book.

20

2
Noumenal Affection
Introduction
In Chapter 1, we saw that transcendental idealism is a metaphysical position which is committed
to these three claims:
(1) The transcendental distinction: Appearances and things in themselves are
ontologically distinct levels or aspects of reality.
(2) The doctrine of noumenal affection: Appearances are the result of supersensible
things in themselves affecting our minds.
(3) The doctrine of noumenal ignorance: We can have no knowledge of things in
themselves, which constitute for us an unknowable part of reality.
Many scholars agree that these three claims are core commitments of the theory, but few believe
that the theory itself, understood in this way, can represent a viable philosophical position. One
significant reason is because of the deeply uncomfortable tension that lies in the conjunction of
the last two claims. The problem is that it seems incoherent for Kant to simultaneously claim that
we cannot know anything about things in themselves and that they affect us. If we cannot know
anything about things in themselves, by what right does Kant claim they affect us? This is a
problem that has haunted and continues to haunt transcendental idealism.
The aim of this chapter is to understand the first conjunct in the problem, noumenal
affection. We will examine the doctrine to determine exactly what sort of claim it is, and in
chapter three we will see if the claim is compatible with its counterpart, the doctrine of noumenal
ignorance. The main work of this chapter seeks to show how the problem of noumenal affection
presents itself differently depending on how we understand the affecting claim, and how this
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consequently determines the resources Kant has available within his own framework to resolve
the problem.
In the first section, I begin with the causal interpretation of NA, which offers the most
influential understanding of the doctrine in the literature.20 The causal interpretation presents the
distinctive challenge as one of consistency, where it threatens to contradict Kant’s views on
causality in the Second Analogy. We will see how some scholars have responded to the
challenge by proposing the notion of an ‘unschematized’ causality.
In the second section, I offer an alternative interpretation of noumenal affection based on
a more holistic approach to the text, which I call the grounding interpretation. I argue that the
grounding interpretation can both avoid the pitfalls of the causal interpretation and better
accommodate the textual evidence for the causal interpretation. In contrast to the causal account,
reading NA as a grounding claim will allow Kant to plead ignorance of the relation between
appearances and things in themselves.
I end the chapter by discussing the minimal knowledge of things in themselves afforded
to us by the grounding interpretation, and therefore set the stage for the final chapter where we
examine noumenal ignorance to determine whether it is fundamentally compatible with NA.
I

The Causal Interpretation of Noumenal Affection

The problem of noumenal affection is essentially the seeming incoherence in the conjunction of
the doctrines of noumenal ignorance and noumenal affection. F.H. Jacobi, in response to this
seeming incoherence wrote his famous dictum: “without the presupposition [of the thing in
itself] I cannot enter the [transcendental] system, and with that presupposition I cannot remain in
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Most scholars subscribe to the causal interpretation: Jacobi (1812), Vaihinger (1881), Strawson (1966), Adams
(1997), Langton (1998), Piché (2004), Hogan (2009a; 2009b), Stang (2015). In the taxonomy I draw below, those
who propose a deflationary reading of the causal interpretation also count as proponents of this interpretation:
Rescher (1972), Allison (1983; 2004).
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it” (1812, 304). To enter the transcendental system, one must accept the doctrine that experience
begins with the mind being affected by things in themselves; but, having accepted this, one is
faced with another doctrine that claims we cannot have any knowledge of the things in
themselves. Thus, Jacobi concluded, we ‘cannot remain’ in the transcendental system by the very
same presupposition that we had to make to ‘enter’ the system, and so Kant’s system is
fundamentally incoherent.
Before we address the causal interpretation, I would like to consider a more general
potential inconsistency in the way that Kant speaks about things in themselves. It is quite well
known to those even mildly familiar with Kant that he admonishes us against speaking about the
things in themselves, let alone the more specific instance of them affecting us. If it turns out that
there is supposed to be a silence policy surrounding things in themselves, it would undercut the
seriousness of the problem of noumenal affection.
We can motivate this worry by asking by what right, to begin with, does Kant speak of
things in themselves? After all, he himself regularly says in the Critique that things in
themselves, which are uncognizable by us, are “never asked after in experience” (A30/B45), and
that the categories “have significance only in relation to the unity of intuitions in space and time”
(B308). These passages seem to suggest some form of general prohibition surrounding talk of
things in themselves. If noumenal affection is in violation of this prohibition, then the problem is
not with NA per se, but rather with talking about things in themselves in the first place.
What could this general prohibition be? The best place to look textually is the specific
restriction Kant places on the categories, the idea that the categories lack ‘significance’ when
taken beyond the limits of experience (transphenomenally). The categories are the a priori pure
(underived from experience) concepts that ground the possibility of experience, and, as such,
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they apply to all the possible objects of experience (A79/B105). Among the categories are
concepts such as <substance>, <causality>, and <existence>.21 Kant tells us that these concepts,
although underived from experience, nonetheless have “no other use for the cognition of things
except insofar as these are taken as objects of possible experience” (B147-8).22 Kant blocks the
possibility that these concepts could legitimately be used beyond the bounds of experience even
though they are, in some sense, free from experience.23
One reading of the claim that the categories lack significance when applied beyond
experience is that they would lack semantic meaning. Thus, propositions such as: “the soul is a
simple substance,” or “God is the prime cause of the universe” are literally meaningless because
they are devoid of any semantic content. Under this interpretation, which anticipates the logical
positivists, the categories lacking significance would be equivalent to Chomsky’s famous
sentence: “colorless green ideas sleep furiously” (1957, 15).
However, there are textual and philosophical evidence that suggests the logical
positivistic interpretation is too strong. For instance, Kant frequently talks about the requirement
to ‘think’ things in themselves even if we cannot cognize them (B xxvi); and he also frequently
makes statements to the effect that, by accepting the transcendental concept of an appearance, we
are forced to admit the things in themselves which underlie them (A251-2, B307, Proleg. 3:14).
These don’t quite add up under the positivistic interpretation, for otherwise Kant would be
saying that we are required to think or admit propositions which are literally meaningless. This
would, of course, entail that noumenal affection is one such meaningless proposition.
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For the full table, see A80/B106.
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A better alternative interpretation of the meaning behind the lack of significance of the
categories is that they would not have what Kant calls ‘objective validity.’ Kant thinks that
concepts lack objective validity if there is no guarantee that a possible object corresponds to the
concept, in other words, that they have a non-empty extension (B302-3n). If our concepts remain
within the bounds of possible experience they can still count as objectively valid even if they
refer to presently non-existent, but really possible, objects. By ensuring that concepts have nonempty extensions, the criterion of objective validity allows us to distinguish concepts from mere
representations or the ‘mere play of the understanding’ (A239/B298). So, if by significance Kant
means objective validity, then not all claims about things in themselves are automatically going
to be a problem for Kant.
Thus far, we have understood noumenal affection to be the claim that things in
themselves affect the mind. ‘Affection’ refers to a relation between our minds and things in
themselves, and so we can think about noumenal affection broadly as the claim that there is a
relation—an affecting relation—which holds between our minds and things in themselves. Let’s
see how this plays out in the text:
The representation of a body in intuition, on the contrary, contains nothing at all
that could pertain to an object in itself, but merely the appearance of something
and the way in which we are affected by it. (A44/B61)
In this passage, we have the familiar story that intuitions do not present to us things in
themselves. Instead, what intuitions present are appearances which result from our minds being
affected. So far, it is not clear whether Kant is saying anything beyond the assertion that
intuitions are the result of sensibility being affected.
But, in other passages Kant employs causal language to describe affection:
The sensible faculty of intuition is really only a receptivity for being affected in a
certain way with representations, whose relation to one another is a pure intuition
of space and time … which insofar as they are connected and determinable in
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these relations (in space and time) according to the laws of the unity of
experience, are called objects. The non-sensible cause of these representations is
entirely unknown to us, and therefore we cannot intuit it as an object; for such an
object would have to be represented neither in space nor in time. (A494/B522)
The first half of this quote basically repeats the passage above, but in the second half, Kant
mentions the ‘non-sensible cause’ of empirical intuitions. Here, Kant begins with affection and
moves to causes. This, and other similar passages in the Critique, suggests that noumenal
affection is a causal relation. Therefore, what it means for things in themselves to affect the mind
is that they cause appearances.24
One advantage of the causal interpretation is that it intuitively brings the problem to light.
It seems the claim that things in themselves are the causes of appearances must surely be
inconsistent with the doctrine of noumenal ignorance, which denies us of any knowledge of
things in themselves. The primary conflict lies in the usage of the concept of causality to
describe noumenal affection. This is because causality as one of the categories entails that we
have causal knowledge (B143-6).25 Kant’s back is against the wall here: He seems to hold the
incoherent claim ‘p, but I do not know that p.’
In the “Second Analogy” Kant gives a detailed treatment of causality. He defines it as a
“principle of temporal sequence” of appearances (A189/B232). In brief, Kant’s argument for
causality begins from the premise that, in experience, some objects possess a necessary sequence
of their states in time. For instance, an oak tree always has a preceding state in time, an acorn,
which necessarily came before its present state. Kant’s claim is that this temporal order in the
object (as opposed to the order in which we perceive, or ‘apprehend,’ the object) is made
possible “only because we subject the sequence of the appearances and thus all alteration to the
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Other passages where Kant describes noumenal affection causally include: A288/B344, A393, and A496/B524.
To be more specific, causality is one of the pure concepts that stands under the category of relation. For our
current purposes, this does not make a difference.
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law of causality” (A189/B234). Kant’s argument is that without the category of cause and effect
there would be no experience of objects with determinate temporal sequences, e.g., the
experience of acorns always prior in time to oak trees, scaffolds to complete houses, fire before
burning, etc. This transcendental treatment (reasoning to the conditions of possibility) of
causality in the Analogy responds to Hume’s skepticism by underwriting the possibility for
necessary connections in general between events in time. It is sufficient for Kant to justify causal
knowledge from the proof of the general principle that events have causes, for then the causal
knowledge that natural science discovers through empirical observation, e.g., that events of type
A have causes of type B, have a prior source of justification which is not derived inductively.
However, Kant’s argument which relies on the necessary temporal order of an object
entails that causality cannot be extended beyond experience (space and time). Kant
simultaneously responds to Hume’s skeptical attack and curbs the possibility for using the
categories transphenomenally, or beyond experience, to construct a systematic metaphysics of
things in general (A247/B304).
The causal reading is in danger of making transcendental idealism incoherent because it
is inconsistent with Kant’s own argument that we do have knowledge of causality. The natural
response to this problem is to look for a way to distinguish the ‘cause’ of things in themselves
from the cause of the Second Analogy. But, can this be done without resorting to an essentially
ad-hoc maneuver? Fortunately, the answer seems to be yes. Notice that the cause of the Second
Analogy exclusively deals with causality between and among appearances; however, the
causality of noumenal affection is not a relation between appearances, but rather between
appearances and things in themselves. If there is evidence that Kant employs distinct usages of
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causality roughly according to these two lines, then we will have a principled basis to separate
the empirical causality of the Second Analogy with the transcendental causality of NA.
In the passage above, Kant qualifies the transcendental cause as a ‘non-sensible’ cause
(A494/B522). Since Kant defines empirical causality as being essentially temporal, this is
evidence that Kant is employing a distinct usage of causality in the case of NA, for otherwise a
‘non-sensible cause’ would be an oxymoron on his terms. This move leads us to the introduction
of the notion of an ‘unschematized’ concept of causality. The ‘transcendental schematas’ are
representations that mediate the pure (non-empirical) concepts of the understanding and sensible
intuitions allowing the categories to be applied to sensible intuitions (A138/B177).26 The idea of
an unschematized concept of causality is simply the category unmediated by transcendental
schemata.
But now, under our present understanding of noumenal affection as being unschematized
causality, what exactly are we dealing with here? The main purpose of unschematizing causality
was to distinguish it from empirical causality; but as a consequence of this move, all we now
know is that unschematized causality is something entirely different from empirical causality,
and thus that it would be wrong to try to understand NA through empirical causality. The initial
appeal of the causal interpretation was that it initially provided us with an intuitive and clear
grasp of what noumenal affection is supposed to be. But it turns out that NA is not causality,
instead unschematized causality. However, the notion of an unschematized causality seems to
just be as mysterious as the affection passages which we began with, and so we are, in effect, in
no better place to understand what sort of claim noumenal affection is supposed to be!
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Kant thinks mediating schematas are necessary because it is a precondition that objects and concepts must share
something in common for the latter to contain (‘subsume’) the former under it (A137/B176).
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Some scholars have argued this implies that noumenal affection is merely an
epistemological relation. On their accounts, noumenal affection just refers to the way we are
forced to think about appearances. In other words, the concept of a thing in itself causing
appearances is just a necessary byproduct of Kant’s transcendental theory of affection. Thus,
Allison, a proponent of this view, writes that “[noumenal affection] merely stipulate[s] how the
affecting object must be conceived of” (2004, 72). Similarly, according to Rescher, noumenal
affection is not to be understood “in terms of the ontology of nature, but rather in terms of the
ontology of mind” (1972, 467). However, both of their solutions are dependent upon their
understanding that Kant is not committed to the existence of things in themselves as
ontologically distinct levels or aspects of reality.27
An alternative account that tries to fill in the content of unschematized causality is Robert
Adams’ proposal that we should understand noumenal affection in terms of what Kant calls a
“problematic concept.” Kant defines problematic concepts as those “the objective reality of
which can in no way be cognized” (A254/B310). The most famous case of a problematic concept
is transcendental freedom (the idea that our noumenal selves are free). Adams proposes that if it
can be shown that the “notion of a problematic concept is philosophically sound” (1997, 821)
then we can justify noumenal affection along the same justificatory grounds which apply to
transcendental freedom. Unlike the previous accounts, Adams allows us to remain somewhat
committed to the ontological reality of things in themselves, but his proposal still necessarily
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Epistemological interpretations maintain that things in themselves are not literally real for Kant. Therefore, they
reject the idea of noumenal affection in any ontological guise and are happy to accept empirical affection as the
starting point of experience. See: Allison (2004), Rescher (1972, 1981).
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weakens that commitment by reducing them to something whose “objective reality” must be
doubted.28
An additional problem for Adams’ proposal is that Kant explicitly states that
transcendental freedom is going to be justified in an orthogonal way, “from a practical
standpoint” (B xxi) and not on theoretical grounds. This should make us skeptical of conflating
any kind of treatment between noumenal affection and transcendental freedom.29
A further problem for the causal interpretation is that it presupposes Kant is guilty of
violating his own general prohibition that the categories should not be taken beyond experience.
If it was not clear from his ethics, Kant, of all people, probably does not take his principles
lightly. When he says the categories should not be used beyond experience, he means it: “the
pure concepts of the understanding [the categories] can never be of transcendental, but only of
empirical use” (A246/B303).30 Although Kant may escape the charge of inconsistency by
unschematizing causality, he necessarily violates the constraint he places on the categories
because to unschematize causality is just to apply it beyond experience.
However, proponents of the causal interpretation are aware of this, and they have
prepared answers in their accounts to respond precisely to this problem. In the accounts of
Allison and Rescher, by presenting noumenal affection as an unavoidable claim of
transcendental philosophy (Allison), or of reason (Rescher), they have already created an
exception for Kant. It is true that he violates the constraint, but he does so involuntarily. Perhaps,
due to this, he is not blameworthy the way his predecessors were. Whereas on Adams’ account,

This is a little better than Van Cleve’s “self-enfeebling” solution, in which Kant merely holds noumenal affection
as a personal conviction because it is not incoherent to hold “p, but I do not know that p” (1999, 135).
29
Desmond Hogan’s (2009b) solution relies on treating Kant’s claims about the causality of noumenal freedom
equally with his claims about noumenal affection.
30
Emphasis is mine.
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Kant flags the violation of his constraint by considering noumenal affection as a problematic
concept. If it turns out that problematic concepts are good enough to shield transcendental
freedom from theoretical concerns, then why not noumenal affection?
This is a peculiar situation. The causal interpretation that has brought us here seems to
only lead us to deeper confusion and disagreement about what noumenal affection is and what an
appropriate solution to the problem would look like. Furthermore, the causal interpretation
demands not only that a solution demonstrates the compatibility between NA and NI but also
provide a justification for Kant’s violation of the constraint he places on the categories. But, this,
it seems, only takes us further away from the problem of noumenal affection. It is at this point
that it becomes difficult to not begin feeling that these are desperate moves in a tight corner and
will only become more so as the moves within the causal framework are exhausted. For this
reason, instead of trying to offer a better move on the board I would like to rethink the problem
entirely, beginning with reconfiguring our understanding of noumenal affection by taking a
different methodological approach to reading the passages of NA.
II

Rethinking Noumenal Affection: The Grounding Interpretation

Kant does not only describe noumenal affection causally. However, if we focus our attention on
those passages alone, then it becomes natural to think that noumenal affection must be a causal
relation. We have seen what sorts of problems are present under that interpretation. In contrast, I
would like to suggest a different interpretation of noumenal affection that is based on a more
holistic approach to the text. This approach consists of (i) considering noumenal affection in
light of the many different formulations that Kant provides, (ii) to regard explaining the unity of
the various formulations as an important interpretive concern, and (iii) to account for why Kant
might have resorted to different formulations of a single claim.
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An advantage of this holistic approach is that it will deal with the causal language that
motivates the causal interpretation, so proponents of the causal interpretation need not worry that
the textual motivation for their view is being neglected. The purpose of this reconfiguration is to
open new possibilities for both understanding the problem of noumenal affection and the
resources transcendental idealism has available to it against this problem.
Earlier, we saw that the causal interpretation takes as evidence passages where Kant
employs causal language to describe noumenal affection. For instance, in (A494/B522) he
describes things in themselves as being the ‘non-sensible cause’ of appearances. However, there
are other passages in the Critique in which Kant does not describe noumenal affection causally.
For example, in A30/B45, he says that the thing in itself is the ‘true correlate’ of sensibility. In
other places, he talks about them ‘grounding’ appearances (A49/B66, A380; Discovery 8:215).
Beyond the Critique, he describes them as ‘underlying’ appearances (Proleg. 5:314-15,
Mrongovius 29:857) or as their ‘supersensible substratum’ (CJ 5:196). It is important to
recognize that all of these are formulations of noumenal affection because they all equally
describe the relation between the affecting object and the mind. Perhaps partly due to the
influential grip of the causal interpretation, not much attention has been devoted to understanding
why Kant employs these different formulations and how they are supposed to be formulations of
one and the same claim.31
To begin, we should consider which formulation has the likeliest potential for explaining
all the others. Plausibly, we might think that the causal formulation is still the one we want. This
is surely a rejoinder that the proponent of the causal interpretation has available to her. We could
potentially observe that all these different languages of things in themselves ‘underlying’ the
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appearances or being their ‘supersensible substratum’ are just looser ways of saying things in
themselves are the causes of appearances. Perhaps, what’s implied in this response is that: What
else, besides a causal relation, could Kant possibly mean? We might think as Piché does that
“Kant cannot help but describe this influence of the thing in itself over sensibility in terms of
causality” (2004, 176). However, I am going to argue that the formulation we really want
involves the concept of grounding. Besides the causal and the grounding formulations, the others
seem to be less intelligible due to them not containing any recognizable philosophical concept
that may help explicate noumenal affection. Furthermore, from a textual standpoint, much like
the causal formulation, Kant employs the grounding formulation in the Critique more
frequently.32 To examine Kant’s understanding of grounds, we need to take a brief detour
through his pre-critical works and his later lectures.
In his pre-critical essay, the New Elucidations (1755), Kant defines ‘ground’ as “that
which determines a subject in respect of any of its predicates” (1:392). As noted by Stang, it was
standard then to distinguish between grounds that were explanatory and those that were
epistemic (this is Stang’s terminology, substituting for the more cumbersome terms used by the
philosophers at the time), where the relevant sense of explanation is non-epistemic, i.e., does not
deal with conferring justification (2016a, 83). For our purposes, the relevant sense of ground are
explanatory grounds, and so I will simply use ground to mean explanatory grounds.
Kant thinks that there are various types of grounds, including logical, real, formal, causal,
and essential grounds.33 Within the subset of explanatory grounds, Kant makes an important
distinction between a logical and a real ground. Logical grounds explain why, for e.g., all
bachelors are unmarried through the logical relation (the principle of identity) between the
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subject and the predicate. In this example, the predicate of being unmarried is already contained
within the subject of being a bachelor. On the contrary, real grounds involve a relation between
actualities or realities, rather than a logical relation of conceptual containment. In the case of fire
being the real ground of smoke, fire is an actual instantiation in the world which then causes
smoke, another actuality that owes its instantiation to fire. An additional difference is that Kant
thinks we have fundamentally divergent insights into these relations. In the case of the former, he
thinks we can understand completely “how a consequence is posited by a ground in accordance
with the rule of identity: analysis of the concepts shows that the consequence is contained in the
ground” (NM 2:202). But in the case of real grounds he asks, “How am I to understand the fact
that, because something is, something else is?” (Ibid). Kant’s point is that in the case of logical
grounds we can understand how they posit their consequences, but with real grounds we only
know (a posteriori) that they do posit their consequences. Yet, how they do so is inconceivable
to reason (Mrongovius 29:809).34
Kant understands causality to be one kind, or species, of real grounds.35 In the
Mrongovius lectures Kant defines the criterion of a real ground as that which “something follows
according to general rules” (29:809). Recall that Kant defines causality in the Second Analogy as
a “principle of temporal sequence” of appearances (A189/B232), whereby the cause always
precedes the effect in time. This qualifies causality as a species of real grounds because causality
determines a relation between a ground and a consequence according a general rule (time).
Empirical causality specifies that A follows from B in time.
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Kant expresses a similar point in NM (2:203-4), which suggests that his position on the mystery of real grounds
unchanged through the critical philosophy.
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Thus, he says, “the concept of cause … presuppose[s] the concept of ground” (Mrongovius 29:809) and not vice
versa.
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Having now sketched Kant’s basic conception of grounds and the genus to species
relationship between grounding and causality, we are now in a position to consider their
differences, and how it may affect the problem of NA. Essentially, the difference between cause
and ground will amount to the difference between a reference to the relation and the things
involved within it, the relata. To illustrate this, let us have a look at the following passage:
The transcendental object that grounds both outer appearance and inner intuition
is neither matter nor a thinking being in itself, but rather an unknown ground of
those appearances that supply us with our empirical concepts of the former as
well as the latter. (A380)
In this passage, Kant says that the thing in itself (transcendental object) that is the ground of both
outer appearances (objects in space), and inner intuition is neither matter, taken as a mindindependent object, nor some kind of Cartesian substance that is referred to by the ‘I.’ Instead,
the thing in itself is an ‘unknown ground’ of both inner and outer appearances.
Let us now read this passage in turn, first assuming that by ground Kant means cause.
Substituting grounds for causes, Kant’s claim is then: The transcendental object (thing in itself)
that grounds appearances is an unknown cause that supplies us with our empirical concepts, etc.
This reading has us interpret noumenal affection as the claim that things in themselves are the
unknown or unknowable causes of appearances. This is where understanding Kant’s conception
of grounds becomes important, because an unknown cause is not equivalent to an unknown
ground; the two are not substitutable salva veritate.
If things in themselves are the unknown causes of empirical phenomena, then it follows
that we would lack knowledge of them in the same way we lack knowledge of many kinds of
empirical phenomena whose causes are still unknown. For instance, the causes of Alzheimer’s
are still poorly understood by medical science, and in physics we still do not know the cause of
the accelerating expansion of the universe. In these cases of unknown causes, we know that the
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cause must be another empirical phenomenon because causality is an empirical relation that
determines the sequence of appearances in time. But when Kant says that we can have no
knowledge of things in themselves, he means that there is an ontologically more fundamental
aspect or level of reality which we do not cognize. Unknown causes are saying too much about
things in themselves because they presuppose the knowledge of the relation (the general rule)
that mediates things in themselves with appearances.
If we read the passage again in terms of grounds, as it is originally expressed, we get a
more plausible result. If the thing in itself is an unknown ground, then we lack knowledge of the
real relation that obtains between the things in themselves and appearances. That is, we do not
know what ‘general rule’ holds between the ground (things in themselves) and the consequence
(appearances). A crucial difference between an unknown cause and an unknown ground is that,
in the prior case, we were ignorant of a relata (the cause) within a relation (causality). However,
in the present case we are altogether ignorant of the relation (the real ground) and all we know
instead is something much more generic. These are two significantly different claims: Unknown
grounds represent more substantive lack of knowledge than unknown causes. For this reason,
unknown grounds are a better fit with Kant’s commitments.
That said, there are two further ways of reading what Kant means by an unknown ground.
Kant can either mean the weaker claim that we have not yet discovered what, or which, type of
ground it is (e.g., whether it is formal, essential, or causal). Or, he means the stronger claim that,
in addition to not knowing what kind of ground it is, we do know that it is none of these other
grounds we are familiar with. It is clear from the text that Kant is committed to the stronger
claim.36
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The problem with the causal interpretation is that we typically consider knowledge of
relations to count as some knowledge of the things involved in them. Hence, it would be
incoherent for Ollie to claim that he lacks any knowledge of Shelo if he also happens to know
that she has a sister, Estel, for then he would possess knowledge that they are biologically
related. Even if we suppose that Ollie knows nothing else about Shelo, we still consider him to
know something about Shelo, and something that is certainly enough for him to retract his claim
regarding complete ignorance of Shelo on pain of incoherence. Scholars are aware of this
problem, and hence some solutions involve reducing things in themselves to a piece of
philosophical fiction (Schaper 1966) or merely a necessary concept that we must think (Allison
2004). In other words, if things in themselves are fictional, then claims about them aren’t to be
taken literally. But these seemingly extreme measures are unnecessary if we don’t take NA as a
causal relation.
The passage I selected above helps illustrate my point, but it is by no means
idiosyncratic. There are other passages where Kant clearly expresses lacking knowledge of the
relation between appearances and things in themselves. He even describes this lack of
knowledge when he talks about NA causally. For example:
How is outer intuition – namely, that of space (the filling of it by shape and
motion – possible at all in a thinking subject? But it is not possible for any human
being to an answer to this question … but rather only indicate it, by ascribing
outer appearances to a transcendental object that is the cause of this species of
representations, with which cause, however, we have no acquaintance at all, nor
will we ever get a concept of it. (A393)
Kant says that the cause of outer appearances is unexplainable by us, and that the best we can do
is posit that they are caused by a transcendental object (the thing in itself). But he does not stop
here. He does not just say that things in themselves cause appearances, he goes on to say that this
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cause is something we have no ‘acquaintance’ with at all and we will ‘never get a concept of this
cause.’ This is denial that we know the relation between appearances and things in themselves.
Some may rightly worry that I am only drawing these passages from the A edition, which
Kant subsequently revised, so let us look at a passage present in the B edition:
The cause of the empirical conditions of this progress, the cause, therefore, of
which members of it I might encounter, and also the extent to which I may
encounter them in the regress, is transcendental, and hence necessarily unknown
to me. We, however, have nothing to do with that, but only with the rule of the
progress of experience, in which objects, namely appearances, are given.
(A496/B524)
Kant says here that even in the representation of the totality of empirical objects we still do not
encounter the transcendental cause within their regress (because the cause, thing in itself, is not
given to us in the empirical regress). Thus, he says, the cause is still unknown to us in this case,
and he is quick to assuage this worry since things in themselves are never asked for in experience
anyway. Again, in this passage Kant expresses ignorance of the cause, that is, the relation of
noumenal affection.
These passages show us that Kant thinks noumenal affection involves ignorance of the
affecting relation. In two of the passages analyzed, Kant employs causal language, but our
analysis demonstrates that they do not support the causal interpretation; rather, they work against
it. If Kant considered NA to be a causal claim, then it must be unintelligible for Kant to deny, as
he does in these passages, that we lack a concept of the relation between the things in themselves
and appearances because causality is a specified relation. At this point, the only way out for the
proponent of the causal interpretation is to appeal to the notion of unschematized causality, but
we have already considered the pitfalls of this move.
Instead, the grounding interpretation can help us make sense of these passages better.
Kant qualifies the cause in these two passages by indicating that they are transcendental. Rather
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than assume that Kant is applying <causality> beyond experience, as he profusely says we
should never do, consider what causality stripped from its sensible condition amounts to?37 It
simply becomes the idea that one thing follows from another ontologically, but without the
general rule that this occurs temporally. This just reduces to the concept of a real ground. Again:
if causality is species of a real ground in which something follows from another thing in time,
then stripped from its temporal condition it defaults into the claim that one thing (the
consequence) follows from another thing (the ground), and this is just a real ground. Therefore,
in these passages, the language of causes neither expresses causality nor an unschematized
version of causality, rather it expresses a generic relation of real grounding. Under our
interpretation, Kant does not fall on the wrong side of his constraint on the categories because he
is not using the pure concept of causality, but rather the logical concept of a real ground, which
has nothing to do with the transcendental concepts of the categories (Mrongovius 29:809). Thus,
it is false that Kant has no other way to express noumenal affection except through the
categories.
I promised that this holistic approach to the grounding interpretation would explain the
unity of the various formulations of NA, and why Kant thought to employ them. I am now ready
to make good on that promise. Recall that Kant has said things in themselves are:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.

The causes of appearances (A288/B344, A393, A494/B522, A496/B524)
The ‘true correlate’ of appearances (A30/B45)
The supersensible ground (Discovery 8:215), or simply ground of appearances
(A49/B66, A380)
The things which underlie the appearances (Proleg. 5:314-15, Mrongovius
29:857)
The supersensible substratum of appearances (CJ 5:196)

He makes an explicit exception in the case of transcendental freedom and talks about the possibility of a “practical
cognition” of them.
37
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All these formulations are explainable in terms of standing under the generic principle of
grounding. A real ground just expresses a relation of ontological dependence: the ground must
come (ontologically speaking) before the consequence. If we look carefully we can see that the
feature all these formulations have in common is their expressions of ontological dependence.
This is true even for the obscure terms like ‘supersensible substratum’ or ‘true correlate’
because, typically, substratas and true correlates imply that they are ontologically prior to
whatever they are the substrata or correlates of. Understanding noumenal affection as a generic
principle of ground accounts for the essential unity of all these different formulations. Causality,
on the other hand, as a species of ground lacks the conceptual generality to accomplish this task.
Our second question asks why Kant resorts to different formulations of NA. I suspect that
Kant does so because it is a natural way of demonstrating the lack of knowledge we have of
things in themselves. By avoiding the consistent use of a technical language, Kant is actually
remaining consistent on a deeper level because it emphasizes that we really do not know what
things in themselves are, and even the way they affect us.
III

Some (Analytic) Knowledge of Things in Themselves

In anticipation of the third and final chapter, we can now investigate what noumenal affection,
according to the grounding interpretation, tells us about things in themselves. The answer: not
very much. However, we should not despair because for Kant’s purposes less is more! The
procedure to determine what noumenal affection can tell us about things in themselves is through
the conceptual analysis of the concept a real ground. But this will only provide for us analytic
knowledge.
Before that, I’d like to clarify why, in the first place, Kant holds that appearances are
grounded on things in themselves. Basically, the question is: why posit things in themselves at
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all? The answer lies in the fact that sensibility only provides the objects of experience when it is
affected “in a certain way” (A19/B33).38 Appearances cannot be all there is because they cannot
just ‘pop’ into existence all on their own, and neither can they exist independently of our minds.
From this, Kant infers the actuality of the things in themselves that ground them.39
The concept of a real ground involves a relationship between two actualities, and so we
can know that if things in themselves are really the ground of appearances, then they must exist.
Another feature of grounding is that it is an asymmetrical relation: the ground is not dependent
upon the consequence (x grounds y, but y does not reciprocally ground x). This asymmetry tells
us that appearances are not the grounds of things in themselves. However, we cannot know if
there are things in themselves which exist that do not ground appearances. For to determine this
we would need to have more specified knowledge about things in themselves. But in our
situation, we can’t even begin to determine the most basic aspects of them, such as whether there
are one, or many things in themselves, let alone their more specified features.40
We have now determined noumenal affection as a generic grounding claim which states
the ontological dependence of appearances on things in themselves. This has provided us with
minimal knowledge about things in themselves. However, our task is not yet finished because it
is not clear that even this minimal knowledge afforded to us is enough to defuse the legendary
problem of noumenal affection. Thus, we now move on to investigate the third and final
component in the problem of noumenal affection: noumenal ignorance.
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See: A490-1/B519-20.
He expresses this most clearly in Mrongovius (29:857): “But are not these sums of appearances things in
themselves? No. For the sensible world lies merely in my senses. These, however, show us only the manner in
which they are affected by the things, but not the latter themselves. They show us merely the appearances of the
things. But these are not the things in themselves. They indeed underlie the appearances, and I can therefore surely
infer the actuality of the things from the appearances, but not the properties of the things themselves from the
properties of the appearances.” (My emphasis.)
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Kant regularly switches between the singular ‘thing in itself’ and the plural ‘things in themselves’ which
demonstrates that the plurality or singularity is merely grammatical.
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3
Noumenal Ignorance
Introduction
A central doctrine of transcendental idealism, noumenal ignorance, claims that we are ignorant
of things in themselves. The problem of noumenal affection lies in the seeming incompatibility
between NI and NA. In the previous chapter, I argued that NA should be understood as a generic
grounding claim of ontological dependence. This interpretation helps us specify the content of
noumenal affection while avoiding a lot of the problems present in the causal account. The
grounding interpretation states that we have minimal analytic knowledge about things in
themselves. Can this be compatible with the doctrine of noumenal ignorance?
Noumenal ignorance is a constraint on our knowledge or cognition of things in
themselves. A rich philosophical account of NI has been primarily hindered by the lack of
understanding of what Kant means by cognition [Erkenntnis] in the first Critique. Though
cognition is a technical term, it has often been misidentified and mistranslated as knowledge
[Wissen].41 There is an emerging consensus in Kant scholarship that the two cannot be equated
together, especially if knowledge [Wissen] is understood as propositional knowledge.42
Kant’s primary concern in the Critique is with cognition. In his famous analogy to
Copernicus, he talks about experimenting with the assumption that objects conform to our
cognition for it “would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of
them (B xvi).43 In comparison, Kant only treats knowledge sparingly in the final parts of the
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(forthcoming).
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Critique in the third section of the “Canon of Pure Reason” (A820-31/B848-59). Likewise, in the
passages where Kant says we are ignorant of things in themselves he overwhelmingly says we
cannot have cognition of them, not knowledge. Thus, the key to understanding noumenal
ignorance is to investigate Kant’s notion of cognition and what their conditions are.
The first section deals with the narrow sense of cognition Kant employs in the Critique,
where it is understood as a mental state involving the faculties of sensibility and understanding.
This notion of cognition will entail two conditions: an intuitive condition and a thought
condition. We will see that Kant holds that things in themselves are uncognizable by us because
they fail the intuitive condition. In the second section, I clarify the difference between cognition
and knowledge. The most important point of this analysis is that, for Kant, knowledge is a
judgement that necessarily involves acts of ‘holding to be true’ [Fürwahrhalten] or assent. This
distinction opens the possibility for having knowledge of things in themselves without cognition
of them. The third section combines the work of the third and second chapters to revisit the
legendary problem of noumenal affection. I attempt to show that the reconfigured and updated
doctrines reveal a potential way out of the problem. The fifth, and final section of this project,
considers the implications of noumenal ignorance on a longstanding debate over whether
transcendental idealism is committed to the existence of one or two worlds.
I

Cognition and Things in Themselves

Kant categorically denies that we can have cognition of things in themselves (B xx, A30/B45,
A43/B60, B66, B164, A190/B235). Within the broader context of his theoretical philosophy it is
not exactly clear what Kant means by cognition. For example, in the Jäsche Logic he details
seven degrees of cognition (JL 65), and in his works he consistently makes a distinction between
theoretical and practical cognition (B ix-x, A633/B661, CPR 5:120, JL 86-7). The interesting
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question involving the interrelated meanings of cognition across Kant’s works is not something I
will deal with here. Instead, I use cognition only in the narrow identifiable sense of it that Kant
employs in the Critique.
In the introduction to the “Transcendental Logic” Kant tells us that cognition is a mental
state involving the faculties of sensibility and understanding:
It comes along with our nature that intuition can never be other than sensible …
The faculty for thinking of objects of sensible intuition, on the contrary, is the
understanding. Neither of these properties is to be preferred to the other. Without
sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding none would
be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are
blind … Only from their unification can cognition arise. (A51-2/B75-6)
This passage helpfully highlights for us several crucial features of the faculties responsible for
cognition. The role of sensibility in cognition is to ‘give’ objects and it does this through
‘intuitions.’ When Kant says that it “comes along with our nature” that intuitions are sensible, he
is referring to space and time as the necessary conditions for our representations. Intuitions
necessarily provide us objects in space and time. On the other hand, he calls the understanding
the “faculty for thinking objects” that are given in intuitions. Cognition arises when an object is
given to the mind (sensibility) and then thought through concepts (understanding).
Both faculties are necessary for cognition. Kant makes this doubly clear when he says
that “neither of these properties is to be preferred to the other” and, in the famous dictum that
follows, “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.” Thus, the
faculties each impose a necessary condition on cognition. We can call the condition set by
sensibility the intuitive condition.
Kant believes that we cannot cognize things in themselves in part because they fail to
meet the intuitive condition. To illustrate this point, consider his reasoning in the Aesthetic for
why things in themselves are not cognizable through space and time. Kant says that even if “we
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could bring this intuition of ours to the highest degree of distinctness we would not … come any
closer to the constitution of objects in themselves” (A43/B60). What would an intuition with the
“highest degree of distinctness” look like? We can imagine an idealized version of natural
science for this exercise. Suppose that scientists had discovered a fundamental ‘theory of
everything’ that could perfectly explain all natural phenomena and their various levels of
analyses, chemical, biological, psychological, etc. Let’s say that this grand theory of everything
postulated that, at the fundamental level, everything is constituted by vibrating strings. These
strings would serve as examples of “the most enlightened cognition” of appearances (Ibid).
Now, the question is whether these strings are things in themselves? If they are, then
there is a way we have cognized things in themselves (strings) from appearances (bodies). But
it’s not possible for these vibrating strings to be things in themselves, because they are still
within the bounds of space and time. Therefore, even perfect cognition of appearances would not
amount to cognition of things in themselves because “we would still completely cognize only our
own way of intuiting” objects (A43/B60). Since the nature of our intuition is sensible we can
only cognize things in themselves if they are presentable to us spatiotemporally. But, Kant
argues that things in themselves, as the mind independent grounds of appearances, are
nonsensible, and thus they fail to meet the intuitive condition.44
Kant says that experience—the awareness of a spatiotemporal law governed world—is
empirical cognition (B147). In other words, cognition is what allows us to experience the world
in the specific way we do. We live with an awareness of the world more than just being filled
with discrete spatiotemporal objects. Our experience is such that we are conscious of the
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connections among objects, their persistence through time, and the general features that they
share with similar objects.45
II

Knowledge versus Cognition

Cognition is a mental state involving the faculties of sensibility and understanding. Kant thinks
that cognitions are constitutive of our experience. Knowledge is another kind of mental state that
has been closely associated with cognition. In this section, we want to understand how Kant
conceives of knowledge and how it relates to cognition.
Clinton Tolley (2017) has insightfully pointed out that Kant places cognition and
knowledge on “orthogonal progressions” (26). In the Critique, Kant locates cognition on a
progression of representations which involves first perception, sensation, and then cognition
(A320/B376-7). But later in the “Canon of Pure Reason,” he draws a separate progression
defined by the different levels of “the subjective validity of judgement” involving acts of ‘taking
to be true’ [Fürwahrhalten] (A822/B850) or assent. According to Tolley, the different
progressions can be understood as being fundamentally concerned with different aspects of our
representations. In the former case, Kant is concerned with “differences in grades or degrees of
‘objective content’ in our representations,” and in the latter he is concerned with the grades or
levels of the subjective validity of our representations (26).
Kant says that assent, or ‘taking something to be true’ “is an occurrence in our
understanding that may rest on objective grounds, but that also requires subjective causes in the
mind of him who judges” (A820/B848). A judgement could have an objective ground46 and be
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account of how it does this, see: Watkins and Willasheck (2017, 95-101). For the importance of the normativity of
cognition, see: Anderson (2001).
46
Roughly, justification. See: Chignell (2007).

46

true but still fail to count as knowledge if the subject does not sufficiently hold her judgement to
be true. Kant specifies three levels or “stages” of assent: “having an opinion, believing, and
knowing” (A822/B850). Assuming a judgement is objectively sufficient, if one neither assents
nor recognizes its objective sufficiency, then the judgement is merely opinion. If one assents but
thinks it objectively insufficient, then it is belief. A judgement only counts as knowledge when
one both assents and recognizes the judgement as objectively sufficient.
In this picture of knowledge, cognitions will typically be necessary for determining the
objective sufficiency of judgements. For example, suppose Cora judges that the red ball she sees
is soft and squeaky. Now, suppose that the ball is, in fact, soft and squeaky. It is the cognition of
it that provides the objective grounds of her judgement. If Cora both assents to her judgement
and is aware of its objective grounds, then she will be in possession of knowledge that the red
ball is soft and squeaky. Cognitions relate to knowledge in a similar way ordinary objects relate
to a posteriori justification.47 Thus, all the knowledge gathered by the empirical sciences are
grounded on cognitions.
Could there be knowledge without cognition? Given the differences between them, it is
logically possible. This would explain why Kant holds experience to be instances of cognition,
even though it does not seem plausible that they are cases of knowing (Tolley 2017, 27). On the
flipside, it seems that knowledge and cognition come apart in analytic statements. For instance,
the objective ground of the judgement that “all bachelors are unmarried” does not immediately

“The touchstone of whether taking something to be true … is therefore, externally, the possibility of
communicating it and finding it to be valid for the reason of every human being to take it to be true … in that case
there is at least a presumption that the ground of agreement of all judgements … rests on a common ground, namely
the object, with which they therefore all agree and through which the truth of the judgement is proved.” (A8201/B848-9)
47
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rest on the cognition of bachelors, but on the logical containment relations between the subject
and the predicate.48
III

Revisited: The Problem of Noumenal Affection

In the foregoing sections, we saw that (i) we cannot cognize things in themselves because they
fail the intuitive condition, and (ii) knowledge, which involves subjective acts of ‘taking to be
true,’ is different from cognition. This reveals that understanding noumenal ignorance in terms of
the denial of knowledge is importantly different from understanding it in terms of the denial of
cognition. It is the latter which is ultimately more consistent with not only the text, but Kant’s
project as a whole.
The Critique is a marriage of epistemological and metaphysical concerns. Kant wants to
investigate the limits of our knowledge, his concern is thus epistemological; but he also wants to
examine the very possibility of knowledge, and thus his concern is metaphysical. To him, these
are not separable questions, and his answer to both turn on the analysis of our cognition.
Therefore, noumenal ignorance should be understood as the denial of cognition and not
knowledge. Let’s now revisit our problem.
During the previous configurations of NA—things in themselves causally affects us—and
NI—no knowledge of things in themselves—the problem of noumenal affection seemed
intractable. These components, previously understood, made passages such as the following
appear deeply inconsistent:
(a) How is outer intuition – namely, that of space (the filling of it by shape and motion) –
possible at all in a thinking subject? But it is not possible for any human being to find
an answer to this question, and no one will ever fill this gap in our knowledge, but
rather only indicate it, by ascribing outer appearances to a transcendental object that
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is the cause of this species of representations, with which cause, however, we have no
acquaintance at all, nor will we ever get a concept of it. (A393)
Here, Kant says that we can never know how, in the first place, it is possible for us to perceive
bodies in space. Instead, he says that we must ascribe to them a thing in itself which causes them.
But, this cause is not something that we know or have a concept of.
The uncomfortable tension lies in the claim that there is a transcendental cause which we
do not know. Supposing the relation between things in themselves and appearances is a causal
one, how are we supposed to not know it, and even worse, not have a concept of it? And even if
we grant for a moment that by the transcendental cause Kant means nothing like causality, there
is still the problem that the categories are being utilized beyond experience.
The problem of noumenal affection has been made difficult through the unnecessary
assumption that noumenal affection is a causal relation. This assumption hopelessly corners
Kant. There doesn’t seem to be a way for him to emerge unscathed, and this is reflected by the
solutions that have been provided in the literature. They span from proposing that Kant merely
believes, as a personal conviction, in noumenal affection and in things in themselves (Van Cleve
1999); that he employs things in themselves as a piece of philosophical fiction (Schaper 1966);
or that he is somehow coerced (by reason or by transcendental philosophy) into the claim that
things in themselves causally affects us (Rescher 1972, Allison 2004). Moreover, the
consequence of these solutions is not only that things in themselves are reduced into nothingness,
but Kant is still guilty of violating his constraint on the categories, and he does not really abide
by the categorical denial of knowledge, either. Instead, he does so elliptically, because you can’t
really (literally) have knowledge of things that don’t exist.
These seem to be messy solutions to a messy problem. But what if we’ve understood the
components of the problem wrong? Let’s try ‘plugging in’ the way I have argued we should
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understand NA and NI. Now, another look at the problematic passage, this time through different
lenses:
(a) How is outer intuition – namely, that of space (the filling of it by shape and motion) –
possible at all in a thinking subject? But it is not possible for any human being to find
an answer to this question, and no one will ever fill this gap in our knowledge, but
rather only indicate it, by ascribing outer appearances to a transcendental object that
is the cause of this species of representations, with which cause, however, we have no
acquaintance at all, nor will we ever get a concept of it. (A393)
Initially, it seems implausible that Kant can claim there is a “gap in our knowledge” if
appearances are just caused by things in themselves. But this tension disappears if we interpret
noumenal affection non-causally as a grounding claim. The ‘gap’ refers to the unknowable
nature of the grounding relation—how is it that things in themselves ground appearances? What
is the general rule that applies? This renders intelligible the final part of the passage, which
claims we lack a concept of the cause, that is, the ground, and acquaintance with it. Since things
in themselves are never present in experience (despite their grounding the appearances) we are
not acquainted with them. This is another way of phrasing what we had discussed above: in the
cognition of appearance there is no cognition of things in themselves. Moreover, it is due to our
inability to cognize things in themselves that precludes the possibility of us having a concept of
their grounding relation. Our inability to cognize them means we cannot determine the ‘general
rule’ that applies to noumenal affection, leaving us with nothing more than the generic concept
of a real ground.
The resource provided by the grounding interpretation further allows us to explain the
entirety of the passage, and those like it, without having to contend with the problem that Kant
applies the categories beyond experience. On my account, he simply does not need the categories
to explain noumenal affection.
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Thus far, we’ve only made sense of the passage in terms of the alternative interpretation
of noumenal affection I proposed in chapter two. However, it is not enough to resolve the
problem of noumenal affection just by moving into the grounding interpretation, because we
need to consider whether the grounding interpretation itself is compatible with noumenal
ignorance. In other words, is the analytic knowledge we derive from the concept of noumenal
affection as a generic real ground possibly compatible with noumenal ignorance?
So long as we do not misunderstand noumenal ignorance as a constraint on knowledge,
then it is possible for NI to be compatible with the merely analytic knowledge given by NA.
Knowing them to be ontologically more fundamental than appearances, for example, is not
derived through their cognition but logically from the concept of a real ground. Therefore, these
minimal claims are compatible.
However, the constraint on cognition is severely limiting. There is very little we can
accomplish with regards to things in themselves without cognizing them. Apart from what
noumenal affection tells us, Kant also says that things in themselves exist, and are nonspatiotemporal. The latter claim finds its objective sufficiency in the surety that things in
themselves are not given to us in intuition because they are non-spatiotemporal. Nonetheless, this
result is in accord with Kant’s project of limiting speculative thought.
The compatibility of noumenal affection with noumenal ignorance crucially depends on it
going no further than merely analytic knowledge and so presumes no cognition of things in
themselves. On its own, it would not be sufficient because the categorical denial of knowledge
would not discriminate between those that are synthetic or those that are analytic. It may be
better to claim only analytic knowledge, but that would still be in violation of the knowledge
constraint. From the perspective of law, an offense is still an offense even if it is a minor one.
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This situation is like the problem where Kant, under the causal interpretation of NA, could not
avoid using the categories transphenomenally. Reducing the severity of the crime is a possible
move, but it is less than ideal and in danger of seeming ad hoc.
Our analysis of NI reveals two flaws in the older understanding. First, the original version
of NI doesn’t enjoy textual support. Textually, it is overwhelmingly the case that Kant says what
we cannot have of things in themselves is the cognition [Erkenntnis] of them. Second, the focus
on cognition coheres better with Kant’s whole project that is concerned with both metaphysical
and epistemological questions. The focus on knowledge cannot explain why Kant cares so much
about cognition, but the reverse is able to explain it perfectly. Kant cares about cognition, first
and foremost, because the limits of what we can know are intertwined with what we can
experience. The upper limit of “sense-meaning” is not independent from the lower limit of
“sense-experience” (Gomes 2017, 19). To understand noumenal ignorance as the denial of
knowledge involves exaggerating the feature of Kant’s thought that inspired the logical
positivists and their verificationism, and it comes at the expense of obscuring other parts of
Kant’s philosophy, namely, the side that rightly reflects him as the progenitor of German
idealism.
In conclusion, with the components of the problem reconfigured it seems that many of
the most persistent issues can be dealt with from within Kant’s own system. Among the most
persistent were the claims that Kant could not be consistent with his own constraints on the
categories or on what he explicitly avows we cannot know. My analysis demonstrates that Kant
is not held hostage by the categories to describe noumenal affection and the minimal knowledge
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afforded by things in themselves are compatible with NI insofar as they do not rest on cognitions
of things in themselves.49
IV

The Implications of Our Noumenal Ignorance

In the final section of this project, I address an implication of the preceding account of noumenal
ignorance on a longstanding debate in Kant scholarship. This is the debate over whether
transcendental idealism is committed to the existence of one or two worlds. This will help
contrast my position on transcendental idealism with respect to other metaphysical
interpretations.
The origins of this debate began with the phenomenalist interpretation of TI, which held
that appearances were metaphysically separate entities to things in themselves. Under the
phenomenalist picture, there is the world of perceived objects, and then there are, so to speak,
their underlying true forms—the objects ‘in themselves.’ This view made it very easy to regard
transcendental idealism as the most unsavory brand of idealism which reduces empirical objects
into second-class entities or mere illusions. Largely in response to the shortcomings of the
phenomenalist interpretation, there began a wave of interpretations which explicitly rejected any
such talk of two metaphysically distinct entities. The epistemological interpretations rejected the
notion of there being two entities (and thus two worlds) by removing the metaphysics from
transcendental idealism (e.g., Allison 1983; 2004). On the contrary, alternative metaphysical
accounts did this by resorting to a different metaphysical picture where appearances and things in
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Readers may wonder how this picture fits with transcendental or noumenal freedom. Kant does not think we can
have theoretical cognition of things in themselves, so not in the narrow way I have been discussing cognition here.
Rather, Kant leaves noumenal freedom and its justification to be dealt with on practical grounds. See: CPR (5:4250). It seems to me that noumenal affection, as the grounds of appearances, and noumenal freedom, as the causality
of the noumenal subject, lie in two separate domains of Kant’s philosophy according to the consistent distinction he
makes between the theoretical and the practical. However, the boundary has not been well respected and the
treatment of noumenal affection is often conflated with freedom (e.g., Adams 1997, Watkins 2005, Hogan 2009a). I
suspect this is because of the dominance of the causal reading of noumenal affection.
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themselves constituted two different, but real, ‘aspects’ of one single thing (e.g., Langton 1997,
Allais 2004; 2015). These views defined themselves, at least in part, against the two-world
picture of phenomenalism.
While I am sympathetic to the concerns and the inherent interest in the question of
whether TI is committed to one or two worlds, I fear that the question itself takes us beyond the
bounds of speculative philosophy which TI itself has drawn. The question requires us to
speculate and characterize the metaphysical identity of things in themselves and appearances in a
way that is at tension with Kant’s overarching project, and specifically with the doctrine of
noumenal ignorance. It seems to me that a ‘one-world’ interpretation would require cognition of
things in themselves because it would have to rule out the possibility that there are things in
themselves which do not have an appearance or appearance-like aspect to them. But we could
never have such determinate knowledge of things in themselves without cognizing them, and this
to me seems to be the result that Kant desires.
It seems that one-world interpretations derive most of their force dialectically in
opposition to phenomenalism. Of course, a two-aspectual distinction of things in themselves and
appearances need not resort, nor even imply, that there are metaphysically two separate entities.
However, how could we possibly go beyond this negative claim without cognition of the things
in themselves? Yet, this negative claim merely establishes the absence of a need to posit an
additional ‘world’ (whatever that might mean) but is logically insufficient to entail the positive
claim that there is only a single world.
Instead, I think that agnosticism is the correct attitude towards this debate. In this vein, I
am aligned with a recent view proposed by R. Lanier Anderson, in which he argues that the
question of one versus two worlds is illegitimate from the standpoint of Kant’s own philosophy
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(unpublished ms., 20).50 Anderson manages to argue for this conclusion without sacrificing
Kant’s idealistic concerns, nor deflating things in themselves into mere epistemological
standpoints. It seems to me that this kind of position is the most consistent with noumenal
ignorance.

Thanks to Professor R. Lanier Anderson for the permission to cite his unpublished manuscript, “Transcendental
Idealism as Formal Idealism,” in this project.
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